By Dr Rajkumar Singh
Prior to the test, the BJP-led NDA government in India carried forward the generosity of the ‘Gujral Doctrine’ but in post-Pokhran concerns were raised at the government’s genuine approach to her neighborhood policy in South Asia. After the tests of 1998, the first thing India did was to declare a ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy and a unilateral ban on testing. India has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to a complete and universal elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite attempts to politically isolate and economically weaken India, its response was to engage the leading nations of the world in patient dialogue. Cognizance must be taken of the fact that India is a mature nuclear power which takes the responsibility of possessing this awesome capability very seriously. In post-1998, the spirit and euphoria of Lahore process disappeared soon and doctrinal and conceptual clarity on nuclear strategy became fundamental to the existence of stable deterrence. Although the strategic elites in both countries have pondered over their nuclear doctrines they seem to have overlooked the ways in which credible cooperation may occur in order to achieve feasible nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear stability.
Dilemmas of the States
It has dismissed the credibility of India’s declared NFU doctrine and but has not elucidated the conditions under which it would be prompted to use its nuclear weapons. Apart from outlining some painfully general conditions of potential nuclear use, Pakistan has deliberately kept its ‘threshold levels’ or the ‘red lines’ unclear, contending that this is its only possible option to prevent an Indian attack. This ambiguity in the India-Pakistan conflict- dyad has led to deterrence instability in the region, rather than deterrence stability. In a conflict-dyad, theoretically speaking, when both parties clarify their nuclear postures, be relative stability. However, when both maintain doctrinal ambiguity there is likely to be increased stability; paradoxically, under such conditions deterrence has the maximum advantage.
On the other hand, when one party maintains doctrinal clarity and the other maintains doctrinal ambiguity there is likely to be instability rather than stability. This happens because the party that chooses to keep its doctrine ambiguous is also assumed to keep its various options open-flexible responses’ including the tactical use of nuclear weapons. This generates a dilemma for its opponents, which is denied the option of similar flexible responses due to its pre-declared postures and resultant concerns about public opinion. In the circumstances, ‘Cold Start’ is the undeclared policy of Indian military which is assumed to be a response to this dilemma. Indian strategists believe that India were to use its ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, it would have a flexible response option that may counter the open-ended Pakistani nuclear strategy. South Asian countries often had different security paradigms and the fact that national security often becomes part of electoral dynamics further complicates the issue. Security policy is moulded by the interests of the ruling elite, thereby making an emergence of a collective security system rather difficult. The different strategies have adversely affected bilateral relations among the other countries of the South Asian region.
Challenges of the Region
This challenge is greater for Pakistan than for India, but failure to address it will have negative implications for both countries. In their march into 21st century, India and Pakistan have essentially two paths from which to choose. The first is a confrontational path-based on cognitive biases. This path will involve an unconstrained arms race, dangerous military practices, and possibly the open deployment of nuclear forces in a “hair-trigger” alert status, resulting in increased security requirements. The second path is that o f mutual accommodation and development o f a cooperative security framework. This second path would imply a major political attitudinal change in both countries toward resolving outstanding political disputes, eschewing an arms race by building restraint regimes, and creating an environment that improves the socio-economic welfare of their citizens.
In line the first strategic challenge is how to create a security balance in the asymmetrical environment of South Asia. The second security challenge is how to configure the nuclear command system to assure safety (preventing accidents), security (maintaining authorized physical custody, preventing unauthorized tampering, access, and use) and survivability (mobility, dispersal and hardening silos and command centers) under the harsh conditions of South Asia. In regard to the strategic challenges, unlike the Cold War, in terms of hardware, the technical stability of South Asian nuclear forces is currently lower than their Cold War counterparts. But peace-time experience will allow the command system to gradually mature. Safe management for nuclear weapons will also improve over time. However, the conditions of instability in South Asia have to do more with the software–the attitudes and policy choices than with hardware.
Time to Move Forward
The challenge is for Pakistan to make prudent choices by assuring balance, but not parity. Given current dynamics, Pakistani choices, not Indian restraint, will be the crucial factor in determining whether the region avoids the trap of an arms race. In the situation, Pakistan must maintain its nuclear and conventional capabilities at a level that will make an adventure costly for India. Both India and Pakistan are expected to rely more on personnel and less on technology in their nuclear management systems. This emphasis will make the system prone to environmental and psychological challenges and human errors in both societies, religious extremism is on the rise, and propaganda and campaigning is on the rampage. Therefore, reliance on human beings, who are affected by emotions and patriotism, will increase the requirements of personnel reliability programmes. A middle course balancing reliance on personnel and technology will be more feasible because weapons are limited in numbers and are located within Indian and Pakistani territory.
Author is Professor & Head of PG Department of Political Science at Bhupendra Narayan Mandal University, Bihar.